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Abstract 
We administered a discrepancy-based measure of anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) 
to a group of 42 right-brain-damaged (RBD) and left-brain-damaged (LBD) stroke 
patients with varying levels of functional motor ability. In addition to the expected 
(anosognosic) pattern of overestimation of motor function in some RBD patients, we 
found an equal and opposite underestimation in some others, both RBD and LBD. We 
also found that around a quarter of self-estimation error could be predicted directly 
from actual ability, such that patients with poorer motor function tended to 
overestimate, and vice versa. This pattern suggests that some misestimation is 
attributable simply to statistical regression. However, even after adjusting for this 
regression effect, levels of overestimation were significantly greater in RBD patients, 
while LBD patients were more likely to underestimate their motor ability.  
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 3 
1. Introduction 
 
Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP) is a term coined by Joseph Babinksi (1914) 
(translated in Langer and Levine, 2014) for a condition in which people suffering 
from brain damage fail to recognise or acknowledge their motor weakness or 
paralysis (Mograbi and Morris, 2018). AHP is unusual in being a meta-deficit that 
exists only in relation to a primary impairment: one cannot be unaware of a symptom 
that one does not have (Gasquoine, 2016). Studies of AHP thus necessarily tend to 
recruit patients with some degree of hemiparesis, typically moderate to severe 
(Hartman-Maeir et al., 2001; Marcel et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2011). However, there 
are potential statistical confounds in selecting only the most functionally impaired 
patients to measure self-estimation. These issues have been addressed in the literature 
on metacognition in non-clinical populations but, to our knowledge, have not yet been 
considered in relation to AHP.  
Kruger and Dunning (1999) suggest that a “psychological analogue to anosognosia” 
(p. 1130) can be observed in people who are unskilled at a task and yet greatly 
overestimate their ability. This phenomenon, the ‘Dunning-Kruger’ effect, has been 
demonstrated in several different cognitive tasks, where overestimation among the 
least skilled is typically observed alongside a less pronounced underestimation among 
the most skilled (Dunning et al., 2003; Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Haun et al., 2000; 
Hodges et al., 2001). To account for this, Kruger and Dunning (1999) proposed a 
specific lack of insight among the worst performers, hypothesising that the ability to 
recognise one’s own shortcomings on a task depends upon the same set of 
competencies required to perform the task: lacking these skills, the poorest performers 
suffer the ‘double-curse’ of being unable both to do the task well and to recognise this 
inability (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger and Dunning, 1999). Conversely, the most 
skilled individuals tend to underestimate their own performance.  
However, as several commentators have pointed out, a more prosaic explanation of 
these patterns is possible through regressive biases in self-estimation (Burson et al., 
2006; Krueger and Mueller, 2002; McIntosh et al., 2018). Assuming only that people 
have imperfect knowledge of their actual performance, their estimations will tend to 
err towards an average level, so if we select a sub-group of participants by extreme 
 4 
actual performance (whether low or high), it is practically certain that their self-
estimates will be less extreme, thus ensuring apparent overestimation among the 
worst performers and underestimation among the best performers. The real or 
artefactual nature of the Dunning-Kruger effect is still a matter of debate, but in 
principle the selection of participants by extremely poor actual performance could 
inflate observed overestimation via this simple statistical bias. 
Is it possible that a similar mechanism could contribute to the apparent unawareness 
of movement problems among hemiplegic patients? This explanation seems 
inadequate to account for outright denial of deficit, as described by Babinski (1914), 
where a completely hemiparetic patient insists that they can move their limb 
normally. However, it may be applicable to more recently developed, continuous 
measures of AHP, which quantify the degree of misestimation through the 
discrepancy between self-estimated ability and actual ability, either observed directly 
or inferred from caregiver ratings. For example, the Visual-Analogue Test assessing 
Anosognosia for Motor Impairment (VATAm: Della Sala et al., 2009) is one such 
measure. This verbal and pictorial scale calculates the discrepancy between self- and 
caregiver-ratings on 12 questions assessing awareness of the ability to carry out 
bimanual or bipedal actions. 
Discrepancy scales like the VATAm are focused on the identification of abnormal 
overestimation. While bidirectional cut-offs could be used to additionally detect 
underestimation, this is typically not the object of study and, where underestimation is 
observed, it may be suggested as a symptom of depression (Della Sala et al., 2009). In 
general, non-anosognosic patients are anticipated to have clear insight into their 
movement ability, and therefore to rate themselves equivalently to their caregivers. 
However, presuming that the patients  have some degree of uncertainty over their true 
level of ability and/or the caregiver estimates are themselves subject to chance 
variations, self-estimates are likely to be regressive with respect to the caregiver 
ratings. In this case, a Dunning-Kruger type pattern would emerge, manifesting as 
extreme overestimation in the most functionally impaired, and underestimation in the 
most physically mobile. The main aim of this study was to administer a discrepancy 
measure of AHP to a group of stroke patients across a range of functional motor 
ability to investigate whether misestimation would be observed in both directions (i.e. 
under- as well as overestimation), and assess the degree to which this is predicted by 
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the patients’ actual levels of ability. Given the commonly observed association of 
AHP with right hemisphere lesions, we also aimed to compare misestimation 
tendencies between right-brain-damaged (RBD) and left-brain-damaged (LBD) 
patients.   
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2. Material and methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Patient recruitment took place on the acute stroke ward at the Royal Infirmary of 
Edinburgh, across a continuous 21 month period. Inclusion criteria were the presence 
of a stroke, determined by CT/MRI scan and neurological examination, and the 
capacity to consent to medical treatment, as recorded in patient notes. Exclusion 
criteria were: inability to communicate sufficiently in English, either through not 
speaking English as a first language or through severe aphasia; diagnosis of a 
concomitant neurological condition, dementia or major psychiatric disorder; a history 
of substance abuse or serious head injury causing loss of consciousness. Informed 
consent was obtained from all patients prior to participation. Ethical approval for the 
research was obtained from the South East Scotland NHS Ethics Committee.  
One hundred and thirty seven patients were approached in total, of whom 55 (40%) 
agreed to participate. Two were excluded after testing because it was discovered that 
they did not in fact meet the inclusion criteria, leaving a total sample of 53 patients 
with complete or partial data. Eleven of these patients were subsequently excluded 
from the analyses; lesion and clinical information was unavailable for five patients, 
three had evidence of bilateral lesions on their neuroimaging scans and three were 
missing data on the critical measure of movement self-estimation. The final sample 
consisted of 42 patients, 12 with lesions to the left hemisphere (LBD group) and 30 
with lesions to the right hemisphere (RBD group). Where the data were incomplete 
for any measure, pairwise deletion was used in the analyses (Ns are shown in Tables 1 
and 2). 
Basic demographic and clinical information is provided in Table 1. The LBD and 
RBD groups did not differ significantly in terms of their gender distribution [χ2(41) = 
0, p = 1], their age [t(18.98) = -.66, p = .52], years of education [t(17.69) = .58, p 
= .57], days since stroke [t(24.64) = -.1.05, p = .31], upper limb motor power on the 
affected side [t(24.96) = 1.19, p = .24], lower limb motor power on the affected side 
[t(20.85) = .39, p = .70], or ability to carry out basic activities of daily living, as 
measured by the Barthel Index (Mahoney & Barthel, 1965) [t(18.47) = .63, p = .53]. 
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The groups did not differ significantly in terms of the frequency of visual field loss [p 
= .43, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test]. However, there was a higher rate of 
contralesional somatosensory loss in the RBD group than the LBD group [p = .01, 
two-tailed Fisher’s exact test]. 
 
Group LBD RBD Total 
N 12 30 42 
Gender  F = 7, M = 5 F = 16, M = 14 F = 23, M= 19 
Age, M (SD) 70.25 (12.74) 73.07 (11.79) 72.26 (11.98) 
Years of education, M (SD)  13.00 (3.57) 12.32 (2.93), N =28  12.53 (3.1), N = 40 
Days since stroke, M (SD) 9.73 (7.75), N = 11  12.96 (9.92), N =24  
11.94 (9.31), N = 
35  
Power (0-5)       
Right upper limb, M (SD) 3.63 (1.50), N = 11 5.00 (0), N = 21 4.53 (1.08), N =32 
Right lower limb, M (SD) 3.45 (1.75), N = 11 4.95 (0.22), N = 21  4.44 (1.24), N =32 
Left upper limb, M (SD)  5.00 (0), N = 11 2.90 (1.89), N = 21 3.62 (1.83), N = 32 
Left lower limb , M (SD) 5.00 (0), N = 11 3.20 (1.77), N = 20 3.84 (1.66), N = 31 
Somatosensory loss, N/valid 2/11 (18%) 15 /22 (68%) 17/33 (52%) 
Visual field deficit N/valid 2/11(18%) 7/20 (35%) 9/31 (29%) 
Barthel Index (0 - 20), M (SD) 12.73 (6.29), N =11  11.31 (6.44), N = 29  
11.70 (6.35), N = 
40 
 
Table 1. Demographic and clinical data for the final sample of 42 participants. 
Number of participants is shown for any measure where data were available for 
fewer than the total number. 
 
2.2. Measures 
 
2.2.1. The Visual-Analogue test assessing Anosognosia for Motor Impairment 
(VATAm)  
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The VATAm (Della Sala et al., 2009) contains 12 test items representing bimanual or 
bipedal actions, for example ‘tying a knot’ or ‘walking upstairs’, each with both a 
verbal description and visual depiction. Respondents are required to mark on a 
horizontal scale, from 0 ‘No Problem’ to 3 ‘Problem’, the difficulty they would have 
in trying to perform each action.  
The scale was completed by both the patients and a professional caregiver, usually an 
Occupational Therapist. The caregiver scores were taken as the measure of functional 
motor ability, which was then compared with self-rated scores, and the discrepancy 
was calculated as the raw self-estimation error. These scores had a potential range of -
36 to +36, with zero representing total agreement, negative scores underestimation 
and positive scores overestimation.  
 
2.2.2 Cognitive ability: the Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS) 
 
The BCoS (Humphreys et al., 2012) is a broad-but-shallow battery of 
neuropsychological tests for the assessment of cognitive function following stroke. 
The battery contains 22 subtests, consisting of 32 different elements (some tasks, for 
example, have an accuracy and a time component) that assess cognition in five 
different domains: attention and executive function, language, memory, number skills, 
and praxis. Tasks not directly assessing language or spatial ability are designed to be 
suitable for administration to patients with aphasia or neglect, respectively (Bickerton 
et al., 2015). 
For the purposes of this study, composite scores were derived to summarise cognitive 
status in the domains of language, memory and attention. Only subtests with >= 35 
observations were included in these composites. Scores on the picture naming, 
sentence construction, reading sentences and reading nonwords subtests were 
converted to percentages and then averaged to provide language domain scores. 
Similarly, for the memory domain, scores on the orientation, personal information, 
story recall (immediate) and story recognition (immediate) subtests were converted to 
percentages and then averaged. As the majority of subtests in the domain of attention 
and executive function had fewer than 35 observations, we derived a score 
specifically for spatial attention using the apple cancellation test; we first calculated 
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the number of targets correctly cancelled (out of 50), multiplied by 2, and then 
subtracted the number of distractors incorrectly cancelled (out of 100), yielding a 
possible score of between -100 and +100.   
 
2.2.3 Mood assessment: Visual-Analogue Mood Scale (VAMS) 
 
Mood was assessed using the Visual-Analogue Mood Scale (Stern et al., 1997), on 
which the patients rated, from 0 to 100, the extent to which they were feeling eight 
different moods: afraid, confused, sad, angry, energetic, tired, happy and tense. Each 
one was presented both in written format and by a cartoon icon (emoticon), and 
participants were instructed to mark on a 100mm vertical scale the point which best 
described how much of that mood they were feeling. Scores for each of the eight 
moods were calculated by measuring the distance of the mark from the top of the line 
in mm, and could range from zero to 100. The scores for the six negative items 
(afraid, confused, sad, angry, tired, tense) were flipped and all eight items were 
averaged to form a single composite measure of mood. 
 
2.2.4 Other measures 
 
In addition to the main measures outlined above, exploratory analyses were also 
conducted to assess self-estimation of cognitive performance on two of the BCoS 
subtests measuring memory (immediate story recall) and spatial attention (apple 
cancellation). These exploratory analyses did not yield any significant findings, and 
were hampered by low participant numbers (see data in supplementary materials).  
 
2.3. Procedure 
 
Testing took place at the bedside, behind a screening curtain, or in a private room if 
the patient preferred. The tasks were always given in the following order: VATAm; 
 10 
VAMS; digit span; BCoS (subtests presented in set order). Tasks were completed in 
one or two sessions.   
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3. Results 
 
Table 2 shows scores in the BCoS domains of language, memory and spatial 
attention, and VAMS mood ratings, separately for LBD and RBD patients, and for 
both groups combined.  
 
  Overall (N = 42) LBD (N = 12) RBD (N = 30) 
BCoS domain scores: 
   
Language  88.05 (11.74), N = 40  85.78 (10.97) 89.02 (12.12), N = 28 
Memory 85.31 (7.23), N = 39 85.17 (6.60) 85.37 (7.62), N = 27 
Spatial Attention  75.70 (28.42), N = 37 91.27 (11.84), N = 11 69.12 (30.91), N = 26 
VAMS  mood ratings  61.54 (19.34), N = 38 65.22 (17.67) 59.85 (20.17), N = 26 
    
Table 2. Scores on the cognitive and mood measures 
 
There were no significant differences between LBD and RBD patients in their VAMS 
mood ratings (LBD median = 70.25, RBD median = 60.25) [W = 177, p = 0.53], or in 
the cognitive domains of language (LBD median = 88.39, RBD median = 92.11) [W = 
118.5, p = .15] or memory (LBD median = 86.25, RBD median = 88.33) [W = 156.5, 
p = .88]. Unsurprisingly, RBD patients had significantly lower scores in the spatial 
attention domain than LBD patients (LBD median = 95, RBD median = 84) [W = 
224.5, p = .007] (Figure 1).   
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Figure 1. Cognitive scores by domain and lesion side 
 
3.1 Self-estimation of movement skill 
 
VATAm caregiver scores were highly correlated with Barthel Index scores [ρ(38) = 
-.89, p < .001], suggesting that either measure provided a reliable representation of 
functional motor ability. The Barthel Index was employed in subsequent analyses as 
the measure of actual motor ability. 
The distribution of VATAm raw self-estimation errors showed substantial variation in 
both directions, and instances of extreme underestimation were observed in addition 
to the expected overestimation, indicating that different patients underestimated and 
overestimated their movement ability to somewhat equivalent degrees. However, the 
self-estimation error was significantly predicted by functional motor ability, [F(1, 38) 
= 12.14, R2 = .24, β = -.75, t(38) = -3.48 , p = .001], suggesting that around a quarter 
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of the variation in misestimation measured by this discrepancy-based scale is 
attributable to actual ability, and therefore potentially to a regressive bias in the 
measurement of self-estimation (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Raw self-estimation error plotted against functional motor ability. The 
horizontal dashed line (slope = 0) shows the relationship predicted if self-estimation 
were perfect, and the line of best fit (slope -.75) is shown in grey.  
 
To remove the proportion of estimation error explained by this regressive bias, the 
residuals from the above linear regression model were saved as a measure of adjusted 
self-estimation error. This adjusted value is the difference between the observed self-
estimation error and the predicted self-estimation error at the participant’s level of 
functional motor ability, i.e. self-estimation error after the component attributable to 
the regressive bias has been removed. 
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Raw and adjusted self-estimation errors for LBD and RBD patients are shown in 
Figure 3. The dotted lines at +6 and -6 indicate standard cut-offs between normal 
awareness and mild over-/underestimation, based on the mean discrepancy between 
two caregivers rating the same patient, plus or minus two standard deviations (Della 
Sala et al., 2009).  
Looking at Figure 3, it is apparent that individually underestimation can be as extreme 
as overestimation. However the patterns differed according to side of lesion. While 
some RBD patients did underestimate (N = 10), many more overestimated (N = 19). 
Conversely, only three LBD patients mildly overestimated their functional motor 
ability, while eight underestimated. Once the adjustment for the regressive bias had 
been made, the only instances of significant misestimation amongst LBD patients 
were instances of underestimation. 
At a group level, a Wilcoxon rank sum test on raw self-estimation error scores 
demonstrated that RBD patients (median = 3) were significantly more likely to 
overestimate their ability than LBD patients (median = -3) [W = 89.5, p = .04].  This 
pattern was observed even when actual motor status had been accounted for in the 
adjusted scores: (RBD patients median = 3.98, LBD patients median = -2.78) [W = 
82, p = .02].  
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Figure 3. Raw and adjusted self-estimation errors by lesion side. Dotted lines indicate 
cut-offs for mild over-/underestimation (Della Sala et al., 2009) 
 
3.2 Relation to mood and cognition 
 
Exploratory analyses were run to assess whether there was any relationship between 
adjusted self-estimation errors and VAMS mood composite ratings, and scores in the 
cognitive domains of language, memory and spatial attention. Spearman correlations 
showed a significant association between mood and adjusted self-estimation errors: 
participants who reported lower moods tended to underestimate their movement 
ability [ρ(34) = .37, p = .03]. Spearman correlations revealed no significant 
association between adjusted self-estimation errors and language ability [ρ(36) = .06, 
p = .73], but there were possible trends towards an association with memory 
[ρ(35) = − .29, p = [0.09] and spatial attention [ρ(33) = −.32, p = [0.06]. 
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4. Discussion 
 
We administered an established continuous scale of movement self-estimation, the 
VATAm, to a group of stroke patients with varying motor status. Levels of 
underestimation were similar in degree and magnitude to levels of overestimation. 
From this study, there is no evidence that stroke patients with good movement ability 
estimate themselves any more accurately than those with motor impairments, though 
they may tend to misestimate in the opposite direction. Regressive estimates may 
have inflated discrepancies between self and other ratings at the extreme ends of the 
functional ability scale, suggesting that the same statistical mechanism that has been 
proposed to account for the Dunning-Kruger effect in healthy individuals (Burson et 
al., 2006; Krueger and Mueller, 2002) could also be a confound in patient studies. It is 
therefore important that researchers take steps to avoid conflating regressive estimates 
with genuine AHP, for example by matching AHP and non-AHP groups for their 
level of functional motor ability, or using different measures to calculate discrepancy 
scores and determine actual motor ability. Assessing self-estimation across multiple 
domains could provide an indication of whether over- or underestimation of motor 
ability generalises to other functions.  
It should be noted that our participant group did not contain any patients with raw 
self-estimation errors exceeding the +24 cut-off for severe anosognosia on the 
VATAm (Della Sala et al., 2009), so it may be that no clear qualitative cases of florid 
anosognosia were included. It is not possible to say, on present evidence, whether 
comparable magnitudes of under- and overestimation would be observed at more 
extreme ends of the scale, or whether extreme misestimation would be more specific 
to overestimation (i.e. AHP). However, there were a couple of features within our 
data that suggested that factors beyond a regressive bias contributed to over- and 
underestimation. First, overestimation was the dominant tendency amongst RBD 
patients, although instances of underestimation were also observed in this group. By 
contrast, the only significant instances of misestimation in LBD patients were in the 
direction of underestimation. The small LBD group size makes this finding 
necessarily speculative, however it would be an interesting avenue for future research 
to determine whether self-estimation in LBD patients is generally characterised by 
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underestimation, as opposed to the known association between RBD and 
overestimation. 
A second feature of note was the observed association between mood and self-
estimation, which could reflect a tendency among people experiencing lower moods 
to underestimate their physical ability, and/or that those who overestimate have a 
degree of anosodiaphoria or unconcern for their motor impairments (Langer and 
Levine, 2014). Previous research has highlighted the association between 
unawareness and unconcern, with the latter sometimes considered to be a milder 
version of the former (Heilman et al., 1998; Vocat et al., 2010). A possible role of 
emotional states in engendering or maintaining unawareness has also been 
demonstrated; for example, inducing negative emotions in AHP patients may 
temporarily improve motor awareness (Besharati et al., 2014). Lesion studies have 
shown that damage to brain regions involved in emotional processing, such as the 
insular cortex, is also implicated in disorders of bodily awareness (D’Imperio et al., 
2017; Moro et al., 2016).  
There are some limitations to this study that should be highlighted. It is surprising that 
no differences were observed between LBD and RBD patients in scores in the 
language domain, which may partly reflect the lower numbers of LBD patients, as 
well as a bias towards inclusion of those with intact language skills, either through 
self-selection or the inclusion criterion of being able to communicate sufficiently in 
English. The relatively small sample size and non-normality of data make the 
analyses of self-estimation and cognitive scores necessarily exploratory. Furthermore, 
there is inevitable variability in data collected in the acute stages after a stroke, when 
cognitive, emotional and awareness symptoms fluctuate considerably, which may 
have been exacerbated by the difference in size between the LBD and RBD groups. 
We have tried to mitigate these issues through the use of non-parametric analyses. 
Future research could usefully investigate whether studies with a larger sample size 
would reveal an association between over- /underestimation and impairments of 
spatial attention (which showed a possible trend towards an association with 
overestimation in our data) or scores in other cognitive domains, such as executive 
function. 
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We began this paper with the observation that AHP is a ‘meta’ deficit that can only be 
observed in relation to a primary impairment. Our findings suggest that the picture is 
more nuanced than this. On the one hand, the observation of under- as well as over-
estimation suggests that even people with little or no physical impairment after a 
stroke can have an unrealistic impression of their post-stroke function, and that this 
can occur in both LBD and RBD patients. However, we also found that, even after 
adjusting for actual motor ability, overestimation was greater in RBD patients, 
consistent with a right hemisphere association for this particular pattern of 
misestimation, while underestimation was observed more frequently after left 
hemisphere damage.   
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